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Abstract
This paper explores a highly controversial issue: while most European
countries are undergoing a clear and well-documented process of secular-
ization, the governments of these countries widely support religious insti-
tutions. The arguments put forward by the median voter seem insuﬃcient
to explain the data. We show that if political parties are allowed to take an
ideological position with respect to religion, the observed deviations from
the most preferred policy by the median voter could be explained. The as-
sumptions of our model are tested using European data. We observe that
citizens are concerned about secularization, but that there are diﬀerences
between religious and non-religious citizens as we assume. In addition, and
in consonance with our assumptions, the percentage of religious-averse in-
habitants is very small.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper explores a highly controversial issue: while most European countries
are undergoing a clear and well-documented process of secularization1,t h eg o v -
ernments of these countries widely support religious institutions. This ﬁnancial
support gives rise to a certain amount of controversy due, in many cases, to a
lack of transparency and the fact that funding is not limited to subsidies but
other types of economic and legal favors as well. In a recent study, Finke and
Grim (2006) conducted an exhaustive analysis of religious favoritism for 196
countries. They use the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Free-
dom reports to code variables regarding national religious institutions, among
them, the Government Favoritism of Religion Index (which takes values from
1Some examples of European studies include Brañas-Garza (2004) for Spain or Voas and
Crockett (2005) for Britain. Iannaccone (2003) in Appendix 1 gives a general overview of
the European trends by country. Sacerdote and Glaeser (2002), Stark, Iannacone and Finke
(1996) or Iannacone (1998, 2003) are recent references in the literature, whereas Chaves (1994)
or Lenski (1963) are well-established references.
30 to 10, where low is less regulation).2 According to these data, the number of
European countries that do not favor religious institutions is very small.
This paper examines why governments favor religions. Obviously, the ﬁrst
explanation might have to do with citizens’ preferences on this issue. Despite
the well-known process of secularization occurring across Europe, religious par-
ticipation continues to be high in a large number of countries. More precisely,
according to the 2004 European Social Survey, more than ﬁfty percent of citizens
belong to some denomination in sixteen out of twenty-six European countries.
Thus, the ﬁrst question to address is the sign of the correlation (if it exists)
between religious participation and the government favoritism index to religion
(GFI hereafter). To do so, this paper merges a GFI provided by Grim & Finke
with information regarding the participation (and denominations) of European
citizens in religious activities arising from the 2004 European Social Survey (ESS
for short).3
2Variables were coded from the reports for 2003. For further information see the Associa-
tion of Religion Data Archives webpage www.thearda.com.
3Some data missing in the ESS-2004 wave were replaced with data arising from the ESS-
2001 wave. This is the case of the following countries: Finland, France, Israel and Italy.
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Figure 1 illustrates the positive correlation between the GFI and religious
participation across Europe.4 It is also shown that most European countries
are far from becoming fully secularized and, at least in some cases, government
favoritism to religion has a simple explanation: the majority of the population
supports religious policy. That is, in most countries the median voter belongs to
the major denomination and therefore supports government favoritism towards
the dominant religion. Therefore, we consider that there is only one relevant
religion within each country.5
4However, in a linear model with a constant (3.47;p - v a l u e = 0.02) the percentage of religious
citizens proves to be non-signiﬁcant in explaining government favoritism to religion (b βR =
3.19; p-value=0.15)a n dt h eR2 is very small, R2 =0 .07.
5This assumption is completely justiﬁed in Europe. There are very few countries with more
than one religion. Moreover, if we consider that, in practise, the diﬀerences among Christian
denominations are small, then all the European countries are single-religion countries. In fact,
the percentage of religious individuals belonging to this category (of Christians) is always over
90%. The only exception is Israel.
5However, the arguments put forward by the median voter seem insuﬃcient
to explain all of the variability in the sample regarding the GFI. A number of
countries (Poland, the Czech Republic or Ireland are the most salient cases)
run the opposite way: the larger the percentage of citizens belonging to any
denomination, the smaller the GFI and vice versa. In addition, there is quite
a large group of countries in which religious participation is about 70% to 80%
that present a high dispersion of the GFI.
In order to explain all these features, this paper explores favoritism in three
steps:
1) We develop a political competition model in which the main assumption
is that citizens consider that secularization might be negative for the country,
in the sense that the country’s society is losing part of its cultural background
and traditional values. If secularization is an important issue in elections and
parties are opportunistic on this issue, the model explains the positive correla-
tion observed between the GFI and religious participation across Europe. We
also ﬁnd that if we allow political parties to hold an ideological position with
respect to religion, the observed deviations from the policy most preferred by
median voters could also be explained.
2) Using European data we empirically explore the role of the variables we
model to explain favoritism. Our model is strongly based on the idea that
citizens are secularization averse and th a tt h i sa v e r s i o ni sr e l a t e dt ot h e i ro w n
level of religiosity, where the most religious are also the most secularization
averse. Using data arising from the 2004 ESS and the International Social
6Survey Program for 1998 (ISSP-1998 for short), we check if our assumptions are
true for the European countries. We ﬁnd that religious citizens are always (in
all the countries) more secularization averse than those who are non-religious.
Additionally, we ﬁnd that the percentage of anti-religious citizens is marginal.
3) Once we have explored the empirical evidence we go back to the model
and its implications. We show that in most European countries, political parties
take a partisan rather than an opportunistic position with regard to the religious
issue. In this partisan environment, favoritism to religion arises as the expected
behavior.
After the introduction, the paper is organized as follows. An economic model
is developed in Section 2. This model is then used in Section 3 to study po-
litical competition. The empirical support for our assumptions is analyzed in
Section 4 using data from the ESS and the ISSP. In Section 5 the model and its
implications (extensions) are discussed with regard to the empirical evidence.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 The Economic Model
Consider a country where the population is composed of individuals that are
religious and individuals that are not religious (labelled r and n respectively).
From now on we assume that there is only one relevant religion within the
country (see footnote 5). Let R and N be the number of individuals that are
religious, that is, those belonging to the main religion and those who are non-
7religious respectively. All individuals vote so they all are considered voters.
Voters care about their private consumption and about the degree of societal
secularization (S). We assume that secularization has a negative eﬀect on voters’
expected utility. This eﬀect is induced by voters’ perception that secularization
undermines societal values which are inherent to their country and therefore
citizens care about these issues. We identify religious environment with national
values such as culture, traditions, folklore, and national history. Note that most
of the European countries have clear Christian roots. Voters’ expected utility
function takes the following functional form:
Ui(ci,S)=ci − βiS,( 1 )
where ci is the consumption level of voter i = r, n and βi ∈ R+ is a parameter
which measures the impact of societal secularization on the utility of voter i = r,
n.
All voters receive the same exogenously given salary w which, after paying
taxes, is spent entirely on consumption. Hence, voters’ budget constraint can
be written as:
ci =( 1− ti)wi = r,n (2)
where ti is the ”ad valorem” personal income tax imposed on voter i by the
government.
We suppose that the current level of societal secularization in the country
8depends on the resources devoted by the government to subsidize the major
religion in the country.
....(S)tate religion also typically involves subsidies, such as pay-
mentsto church employees, and the collection of taxes dedicated to
church uses. Barro and McCleary (2005)
Let x be the government’s subsidy for the major religion in the country.
In particular, the larger the religious subsidy, the lower the degree of societal
secularization, i.e. S(x) with S0(x) < 0. We also assume decreasing rates of
return of S(x) with respect to the religious subsidy x.T h a ti s ,S00(x) > 0.
The government uses taxes to fund the religious subsidy. We assume that
the government’s budget is always balanced, that is,
x = w(trR + tnN) (3)
We suppose that the subsidy cost may not be equally distributed among
religious and non-religious voters. Religious voters contribute the same or more
than non-religious voters:
tn = αtr α ∈ [0,1], (4)
where α is the parameter that stands for equality in sharing the cost of the
religious subsidy among the two groups of voters.
From the government’s budget constraint the government’s religious subsidy
(x) is represented by the following personal income tax function imposed on
9religious voters:
x = trw(R + αN) (5)
Regarding the optimal religious subsidy for religious voters, x∗
r,w eﬁnd that,




βr (R + αN)
(6)







When doing the same for non-religious voters we ﬁnd that, given a certain












Regarding voters’ optimal religious subsidy we can make two straightforward
remarks: i) for religious (non-religious) voters, the optimal religious subsidy in-
creases (decreases) with the equality in the share of the cost of the religious
subsidy, i.e. x∗
r(α), x∗0
r (α) > 0 (x∗
n(α), x∗0
n(α) < 0); ii) if the secularization
aversion of religious voters (βr)i ss u ﬃciently large with respect to the secu-
10larization aversion of non-religious voters (βn), the optimal religious subsidy is
larger for religious voters than for non-religious voters. More precisely, the op-






Notice that the higher the tax equality between the two groups, the more
likely religious voters are to prefer higher subsidies than non-religious voters.
If the subsidy cost is shared equally (α =1 ), the optimal subsidy for religious
voters will always be larger than the optimal subsidy for non-religious voters
since βr >β n.
T h ea b o v ei d e a sh a v es o m ei n t e r e s t i n gi m p l i c a t i o n s . I fw ea s s u m et h a tβr
and βn are such that condition (10) holds and that the number of religious
voters is larger than the number of non-religious voters (R>N) —as occurs in
the majority of European countries— we then have two salient conjectures:
Conjecture 1 Assume that βr and βn are such that condition (10) holds and





r − e x| < |x∗
n − e x|.
Conjecture 2 Assume that βr and βn are such that condition (10) holds and
R>Nthen, the cost of the actual subsidy would be shared by both religious and
11non-religious voters, that is:
1=α∗
r ≥ e α>α ∗
n =0 .
Note that the above conjectures show that for some preferences (βr >> βn)
and religious distributions in the population, both the subsidy and the share
of the subsidy cost would be closer to those of religious subjects and clearly
positive. Recall that both measures reﬂect religious favoritism.
Also, note that both ideas explain why there is a positive relationship be-
tween favoritism and the fraction of religious population ( R
N)a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e
1 above. However, they do not explain the countries that are not on the diagonal
such as Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland or Iceland.
In the next section regarding preferences on secularization, we use a political
competition game to determine the actual degree of government favoritism to
religion. Using the degree of favoritism implemented at the political equilibrium,
we check whether the previous conjectures are true or not.
3 Political competition
In the model described thus far we have assumed that there exists a government
which, in order to control secularization, favors religious activities by means of
a religious subsidy (x). This religious subsidy is funded by the revenues ob-
tained from voters’ personal income tax (t), which may be more or less equal for
religious and non-religious voters (α). Thus, the government’s choices are rep-
12resented by a triplet (x,t,α)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the government’s budget constraint.
Notice that if the government’s budget constraint has to be satisﬁed, choosing
only two of these three variables determines a unique value for the third one.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the level of religious subsidy and
t h ei n c o m et a xr a t e( x,t) are chosen by the government. Hence, the degree of
equality in the share of the cost of subsidy α will be given by the government’s
budget constraint for each pair of values for x and t.
In this section, we analyze the political competition before the government is
elected. We consider a two-party model of competition. As we explained above,
parties’ choices are represented by the level of religious subsidy and the income
tax rate (xj,t j). Thus, the policy space is X = R+ × [0,1].
A voter will vote for the party that pledges to provide a higher level of utility.
That is, worker i will vote for party 1 if Ui(x1, t1) >U i(x2, t2), but will vote
for party 2 if Ui(x2, t2) >U i(x1, t1). In case of indiﬀerence, a voter is assumed
to vote for each party with equal probability.
The game takes place in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, parties propose a
certain policy in X. In the second stage, each voter votes for the party whose
proposal provides a higher utility. We assume that parties are fully committed
to their policy proposals. This means that the party that wins the election has
to implement the policy chosen in the ﬁrst stage.
The winner is elected by majority rule. In case of a tie, both parties win
with the same probability (equal to 1
2). We assume that parties maximize the
probability of winning. Thus, the payoﬀ function of a party can be deﬁned as:
13Vj(xj,t j)=
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2 if #{v : Uv(xj,t j) >U v(xk,t k)} + B
2 = R+N
2
0 if #{v : Uv(xj,t j) >U v(xk,t k)} + B
2 < R+N
2
where #{v : Uv(xj,t j) >U v(xk,t k)} is the number of voters who prefer to vote
for party j (j 6= k)a n dB =# {v : Uv(xj,t j)=Uv(xk,t k)} is the number of
voters that are indiﬀerent to both parties. Thus, if the number of voters that
prefer to vote for party j plus half of the voters which are indiﬀerent to both
parties is larger than half of the total number of voters, party j will win the
election.
We consider two diﬀerent scenarios: i) First, parties are purely opportunistic.
That is, parties decide about both variables simultaneously in order to win the
election. In this case, a strategy is deﬁned as (xj,t j) ∈ X; ii). Second, parties
hold an ideological position on the religious issue. We assume that the level
of religious subsidy is ﬁxed for each party and they can only decide the tax
scheme. That is, parties present a tax platform to win the election solely in
order to implement their preferred religious policy. Hence, a strategy for a
party is tj ∈ [0,1].
Since voter behavior is unambiguous in this model, we deﬁne a game equilib-
rium only in terms of the strategies of the two parties at the ﬁrst stage. Thus, in
the opportunistic setting a pure-strategy equilibrium is a pair of values for the





14such that both parties maximize the probability of winning given their oppo-
nent’s choices. In the ideological setting, given x1 and x2, a pure strategy
equilibrium is a pair of values for the taxes [te
1(x1,x 2),t e
2(x1,x 2)] such that both
parties maximize the probability of winning given their opponent’s choice.
3.1 Opportunistic parties
Let us suppose that parties are purely opportunistic, that is, they choose both
the level of religious subsidy and the tax in order to win the election.
Given this scenario, an important variable for political parties will be the
number of religious and non-religious voters because the preferences of the me-
dian voter coincide with the preferences of the majority of society.
If R>N , the median voter will be religious. Therefore, in order to maxi-
mize the probability of winning, parties will try to obtain the vote of religious
voters.G i v e n a t a x t, the largest utility that a party can oﬀer to a religious
voter is Ur(x∗
r(t),t),t h a ti s ,t h ereligious voters’ utility when the government
implements the optimal level of religious subsidy for religious voters. Addition-
ally, given a positive level of religious subsidy x, the maximum utility that a
party can oﬀer to a religious voter is Ur(x, x
w(R+N)), that is, the religious voters’
utility when the government distributes the share of the subsidy cost equally
among voters (α =1 ). Thus, when the median voter is religious, e x = x∗
r and
e α = α∗
r =1 .
A similar result is obtained when the median voter is non-religious (if N>
R). Given a tax t, the highest utility that a party can oﬀer to a non-religious
15voter is Un(x∗
n(t),t),t h a ti s ,t h enon-religious voters’ utility when the govern-
ment implements the optimal level of religious subsidy for non-religious voters.
Additionally, given a positive level of religious subsidy x, the highest utility that
ap a r t yc a no ﬀer to a non-religious voter is Un(x,0),t h a ti s ,t h enon-religious
voters’ utility when the government makes only religious voters pay taxes to
ﬁnance the religious subsidy (α =0 ). Hence, e x = x∗
n and e α = α∗
n =0 .
Proposition 1 When parties choose both t and x simultaneously, the unique
equilibrium outcome will be a tie: both parties win the election with a prob-
ability equal to 1
2. Moreover, a pure strategy equilibrium will be the optimal















n,0)] if N>R .
Proof. Since both parties are ap r i o r iidentical, if one of them chooses (x,t)
such that it wins the election with probability 1, there cannot be an equilibrium
because the party’s opponent may choose the same (x,t) and win the election
with a probability of 1
2. Thus, if the game does not end in a tie, matching
t h eo p p o n e n t ´ ss t r a t e g yi sa l w a y sap r o ﬁtable deviation for one of the parties.
Hence, the unique equilibrium outcome will be that both parties win the election
with a probability equal to 1
2.
If R>N, the party that oﬀers a pair (x,t) such that the utility of religious
voters is higher will win the election. Given a pair of values (x1,t 1) with t1 >
x
w(R+N), party 2 can win the election with a probability equal to 1 by choosing
x2 = x1 and t2 <t 1. Thus, in equilibrium both parties must choose t2 = t1 =
x
w(R+N).
16Suppose that t2 = t1 = x
w(R+N) and party 1 chooses x1 6= x∗
r. Party 2 can
then win the election by choosing x2 = x∗
r. Thus, in equilibrium both parties
must choose x1 = x2 = x∗
r. Hence, [x∗
r,1] has to be chosen by both parties at
equilibrium.
Similarly, we can prove that if N>R ,then [(x∗
n,0),(x∗
n,0)] can be sustained
as an equilibrium.
A clear implication arises from the previous result:
Implication 1 Under opportunistic parties, the percentage of religious citizens
( R
N) determines both the level of religious subsidies implemented by the govern-
ment and the share of the cost.
Thus, under opportunistic parties, the median voter’s level of religiosity
might explain part of the observed behavior in Figure 1. Additionally, we can
conclude that if parties are opportunistic, the conjectures stated above are both
true. Our arguments serve to explain countries which largely favor religion and
those in which no aid is provided by the government. However, we are unable
to explain the values in the middle of the interval.
3.2 Ideological Parties
We consider ideology as a strong preference for one of the policy instruments.
It is assumed that parties are committed to implementing a speciﬁc policy re-
garding religious policy. By Non-Religious party we denote the party that is
committed to a lower level of religious subsidy, whereas Religious party refers to
the party committed to a higher level of religious subsidy (i.e. xR >x N). Thus,
17ideology can be interpreted in this game as the intensity of protection against
secularization, that is, the amount of religious subsidies.
Given that the level of religious subsidy is supposed to be ﬁxed by the parties,
they only have to propose their tax schemes.
L e tu sn o wf o c u so nac o u n t r yw i t ham a j o r i t yo freligious voters.I fR>N,
the median voter will be religious and, given a certain level of religious subsidy
x, any political party will try to propose a value for t in order to give religious
voters a higher level of utility than that oﬀered by their opponent. Since the
level of religious subsidy is given, societal secularization is also given in the
country. Thus, parties will want to oﬀer a value for t that minimizes the cost
imposed upon religious voters.
Given a ﬁxed value of x, the optimal value of t for religious voters is
t = x
w(R+N). Thus, the maximum utility that party j can oﬀer to religious
voters given a ﬁxed value of xj is Ur(xj, xj
w(R+N)). Then, if Ur(xN, xN
w(R+N)) >
Ur(xR, xR
w(R+N)) the Non-Religious party has a non-empty set of dominant strate-
gies that guarantees a sure victory (this set will include the optimal tax for the




Otherwise, if Ur(xN, xN
w(R+N)) <U r(xR, xR
w(R+N)),t h eReligious party has a
non-empty set of dominant strategies that guarantees a sure victory (this set




Finally, if Ur(xN, xN
w(R+N))=Ur(xR, xR
w(R+N)),t h e nb o t hp a r t i e sc a na s s u r e
at i eb yc h o o s i n gtj = xj
w(R+N).
Notice that if both parties choose the value for t that minimizes the tax
18imposed on religious voters (i.e. tj = xj
w(R+N)), the Religious party will win the
election if Ur(xN, xN
w(R+N)) <U r(xR, xR













The previous result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose xR >x N are ﬁxed and parties choose t,t h e ni fR>N,
the Religious party has a non-empty set of strictly dominant strategies and
the equilibrium outcome of the election is that the Religious party will win the











T h ei n e q u a l i t yw r i t t e ni nt h ep r o p o s i t i o ni sc o m p o s e do ft w op o s i t i v et e r m s
since xR >x N and S0(x) < 0. The one on the left-hand side represents the
beneﬁt to religious voters in terms of the secularization derived from voting for
the party that favors religion the most. The one on the right-hand side represents
the cost to religious voters in terms of the private consumption derived from
voting for the party that favors religion the most when both parties propose
an equal share of the cost of the religious subsidy. Hence, given a high enough
marginal return of anti-secularization policies for the median voter, the religious
party wins and the implemented policy is e x = xR >x N ≥ 0.
The previous result has a clear implication:
Implication 2 Under ideological parties and for any percentage of religious
19population, the amount of subsidy is always positive when anti-secularization
policies are proﬁtable enough (in terms of individual utility).
In sum, if parties are ideological on the religious issue, voter religiosity is not
a determinant for the level of favoritism in contrast to what occurs when parties
are opportunistic on this issue. In this case, the key for the most religious party
to win and implement some favoritism is the eﬃcacy of the anti-secularization
policy (in terms of individual utility) for the median voter. This result may
serve to explain both types of European countries in Figure 1:
i) the large group of countries with about 70% to 80% of religious partici-
pation that show a high dispersion regarding the GFI.
ii) countries with a large percentage of citizens belonging to a denomination
and a small GFI and vice-versa.
4 Empirical Evidence
The model presented above and, obviously, its implications crucially depend
on a variable that we name secularization aversion. This variable reﬂects the
loss of main attributes of the religious environment as perceived by citizens.
Throughout the paper we assume that the level of secularization aversion for
all citizens is positive, βi > 0, i = n,r, while the level of aversion for religious
citizens is larger, βr >β n. In this section we will attempt to check if both
assumptions are possible using European data.
Unfortunately, we did not ﬁnd this variable in the most well-known surveys
20on religion: the European-ESS and the International-ISSP. However, we did
ﬁnd something similar in the latter survey. This survey includes a question that
addresses the issue of secularization aversion. The question reads as follows 6:
item 31: [country name] would be a better country if religion had less inﬂu-
ence?7
The possible answers are: (1) Strongly agree; (2) Agree; (3) Neither agree
nor disagree; (4) Disagree; (5) Strongly disagree. Now we establish a simple par-
allelism: We call subjects who consider religion to be negative religious averse
(v31 =1 ,2), while those who consider religion to be positive are called secular-
ization averse (v31 =4 ,5). To simplify we deﬁne v31 =3as religious neutral.
Our model explores secularization aversion for religious and non-religious
citizens. Formally, the ISSP provides this classiﬁcation in item 60:
item 60: Would you describe yourself as: (1) Extremely religious; (2)V e r y
religious; (3) Somewhat religious; (4) Neither religious nor non-religious;
(5) Somewhat non-religious; (6) Very non-religious; (7)E x t r e m e l yn o n -
religious.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sc l a s s i ﬁcation, we classify subjects as religious, r, v60 =
1,2,3 and as non-religious, n, v60 =5 ,6,7. Individuals with values =4are
omitted from the analysis.
6Note that a number of European countries are not included in the ISSP—1998 wave: Bel-
gium, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg and Ukrania. Also note that data for Germany
is the mean of East/West observations and that Ireland includes North Ireland.
7This is exactly as the item appears on the ISSP questionnaire.
21Now we combine both item 31 and item 60 in order to obtain a measure
of the parameter that stands for individuals’ level of secularization aversion
(βi). We analyze two important issues empirically: 1) we want to check the
value, if positive, of secularization aversion and more speciﬁcally, if there is
any diﬀerence between religious and non-religious citizens, that is, βr >β n; 2)
we study the proportion of countries that have a majority of religious citizens
because this situation may be crucial to explaining the observed favoritism.
Using the information provided in the ISSP (items 31 and 60) and in the ESS
(to show the percentage of religious citizens) we build Table 1.
Columns 2—5 in Table 1 check if secularization aversion is suﬃciently larger
for religious than for non-religious citizens (βr >β n) for each country. Column
4 shows the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test and column 5 evaluates if the
assumption is plausible.
The rest of the Table studies national religiosity. Columns 6-7 show the
percentage of religious population by country (using the 2004-ESS8)a n dt h e
percentage of citizens that clearly declared themselves to be religious-averse
(v31 =1in item 31).
8We use data from the ESS instead of using data from the ISSP to be consistent with
Figure 1.
22Table 1: Secularization Aversion
βr>β n R>N
βr βn ZR #1
Austria 3.21 2.89 −5.87 yes 0.71 5.3%
Bulgaria 3.50 2.99 −6.10 yes − 4.7%
Czech R. 3.95 3.05 −9.46 yes 0.28 5.1%
Denmark 3.81 3.55 −3.53 yes 0.62 2.9%
France 3.98 2.98 −14.15 yes 0.50 0.8%
Germany 3.63 2.92 −7.58 yes 0.54 1.95%
Hungary 3.77 3.17 −8.12 yes 0.63 1.4%
Ireland 3.38 2.60 −8.60 yes 0.87 1.6%
Israel 3.90 2.32 −18.07 yes 0.75 3.0%
Italy 3.34 2.84 −7.98 yes 0.76 4.4%
Holland 3.39 2.37 −13.99 yes 0.46 2.0%
Norway 3.80 2.57 −15.38 yes 0.50 1.9%
Poland 3.13 2.50 −7.01 yes 0.92 1.5%
Portugal 3.03 2.76 −3.77 yes 0.86 5.4%
Slovakia 3.66 2.64 −11.23 yes 0.75 3.1%
Slovenia 3.67 2.64 −12.56 yes 0.69 4.9%
Spain 3.50 2.99 −13.83 yes 0.74 1.1%
Switzerland 3.69 3.13 −9.52 yes 0.70 4.1%
Sweden 4.20 3.19 −10.83 yes 0.32 1.8%
U.K. 3.89 2.65 −10.56 yes 0.51 0.4%
23Let us make three remarks regarding the data in Table 1. First, the intuitive
assumption that religious individuals are more concerned about secularization
seems to be true for all the European countries considered in the sample. This
is important because we observe that βr >β n in all countries regardless of the
percentage of religious citizens as we assume in our model.
Second, more than ﬁfty percent of the population is religious in a large num-
ber of European countries. The Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden
are the only exceptions.
We can observe both crucial ideas in almost all European countries: R>N
and βr >β n. This means that a majority of the population is always in favor
of favoritism towards religion.
Finally, the proportion of clearly religious-averse citizens is very small and
never larger than 6%. That is, almost all individuals are somewhat concerned
about societal secularization. Therefore, in electoral terms, the potential cost of
pro-religion policies is very low.
In sum, the data set seems to support our model: i) subjects are generally
concerned about secularization, ii) religious subjects are more concerned about
this issue, iii) in the majority of European countries the proportion of religious
citizens exceeds ﬁfty percent, and iv) the percentage of citizens who react neg-
atively to pro-religion policies is marginal. From an empirical standpoint, we
can conclude that religious favoritism seems to be politically proﬁtable.
245 Discussion
Let us now discuss the relevance of political party behavior (opportunism vs.
partisanship) in explaining government favoritism to religion.
Under opportunistic parties on the religious issue we can easily explain
the observed favoritism as the result of the optimal policy for the median voter.
When the median voter is religious (under R>N ), 9 the policy implemented
constitutes the optimal policy for this type of voter i.e. e x = x∗
r. Also, given the
FOC (see equation [6] on page 10), an increase in religious voter’s aversion to
secularization increases the implemented religious subsidy, that is, ∆βr ⇒ ∆x∗
r .
Hence, the larger the national secularization aversion, the larger the level of
religious favoritism.
The latter may seem to be a simple and sensible explanation for the behavior
observed in Figure 1: the level of religiosity within society (deﬁned not only by
the proportion of religious citizens, but also by the level of their secularization
aversion ) is a predictor of government favoritism to religion. However, when
comparing the government favoritism index to the median voter’s level of secu-
larization aversion in countries where the majority of the population is religious,
we do not ﬁnd a positive correlation (as shown in Figure 2). This empirical result
contrasts with the assumption that parties behave in an opportunistic manner
regarding religion.
9Recall that the opposite case, N>R , seems to be trivial in Europe.
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In fact, opportunism regarding religious issues seems to be rare in religious
countries. Religion is not just another issue in the political arena. Many political
parties in countries across Europe hold a clear ideological position on religious
issues. Obvious examples are the Shas (Israel), Partido Popular (Spain), Forza
Italia (the largest majority faction of the former Democrazia Cristiana in Italy),
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands CDU (Germany), Österreichische
Volkspartei ÖVP (Austria), to name but a few. Moreover, most of these political
parties belong to the European People’s Party (the largest political group in the
European Parliament) which declares itself to be Christian.
With regard to partisan parties on the religious issue, the results diﬀer
from the former case: the religious makeup of the population is not the only
26factor that determines which party will win. In fact, depending on whether
the optimal policy for the median voter is closer to one party than to another,
one and not the other will win.10 In addition, there are only two possible
implementable degrees of government favoritism to religion, both of which are
given from the parties’ ideological positions. This idea is illustrated in the ﬁgure
below.
Figure 3: Political Equilibrium under Partisan Parties
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T h ep i c t u r ea b o v es h o w st h r e ed i ﬀerent situations depending on whether the
median voter’s optimal level of subsidy is low (xa∗
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regarding the parties’ ideological positions on this issue.
Case a) shows a median voter with reduced preferences for religion who is,
in fact, less religious than the non-religious party. In this case, the prediction is
10This is an alternative interpretation of Proposition 2. Notice that the latter Proposition
shows that the eﬃcacy of the religious subsidy policy (
−4S(x)
4x ) matters. In particular, if
eﬃcacy is high enough, the Religious party will surely win the election. However, since
S00(x) > 0,e ﬃcacy decreases on x, meaning that the lower the level of religious subsidy
pledged by both parties, the higher the probability that the Religious party will win.
27clear: the less religious party will win. Then, x∗
r(βr) <x N =⇒ the non-religious
party wins and e x = xN.
Case c) is also clear. When the median voter is more religious than the
religious party, then the latter will win. Hence, x∗
r(βr) >x R =⇒ e x = xR. This
case may shed some light on the recent victory of religious parties in countries
such as Poland.11 More precisely, Poland is a country with a very religious
population (most of whom are Catholic) that has recently been immersed in a
process of transition from Communism. It is therefore plausible to think that
concern about secularization was quite high among citizens in Poland during
Communism. Consequently, citizens’ optimal degree of government favoritism
to religion was higher than the implemented government favoritism to religion
during this period. If we observe the case of Poland in Figure 1, we can see
that the current level of favoritism is low. However, it is likely that the religious
party Law and Justice,w h i c ht o o ko ﬃce in 2006, will notably increase ﬁnancial
support to the Catholic Church.
Case b) is the most enlightening. Here there is no direct result since the
ﬁnal outcome will be determined by the proximity of the median voter’s opti-
mal policy to each party’s ideological position. Recall that parties may not
vary their position on the religious issue —they are ideological— but, they have
clear incentives to manipulate voters’ secularization aversion, βi. The following
picture depicts the religious party’s incentive to increase median voter’s concern
about secularization.
11The party that won the largest percentage of votes in the 2005 elections was Law and
Justice, a center-right party that pledges to uphold traditional family and Christian values.








Thus the religious party12 has clear incentives to manipulate β
0s distribution.
Parties may ﬁnd it very proﬁtable to promote fundamentalism: as religious
voters’ negative concern about societal secularization increases (higher values of
βr) religious voters will tend to vote for the Religious party that will be more
likely to win the election.
In this context, we might consider that Religious parties have an interest in
raising religious voters’ negative perception about societal secularization. In this
way, it seems to be very sensible that conservative parties (probably inﬂuenced
by religious conservatives) have recently undertaken widespread campaigns for a
return to traditional values, such as the Back to Basics Campaign by the former
British Prime Minister John Major. In the European Union, a conservative
campaign sought to specify certain conservative values in the proposed European
Constitution. Most prominently, Pope John Paul II lobbied for the inclusion of
12The idea is symmetric for non-religious parties.
29a reference to God, but was narrowly defeated.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In a recent paper Grim and Finke showed that most of the governments in
European countries favor religion and what is even more striking is that many
of them favor it to a large degree.
To study this phenomena, which would appear to be rare given the recent,
well-documented secularization trend across Europe, we develop a political com-
petition model. We analyze two scenarios: when parties are opportunistic on
the religious issue and when parties are ideological on the issue.
Under opportunistic parties we ﬁnd that median voter religiosity determines
the level of favoritism: the more religious the population, the higher the level of
favoritism to religion.
The scenario in which parties are ideological permits us to explain a wide
number of cases. The distance between the median voter’s secularization aver-
sion and the ideology of the most religious party determines who will win the
election and the subsequent level of favoritism implemented by the government.
This result may serve to explain both: i) the large group of European countries
with a similar percentage of religious participation (about 70% to 80%) which
present a high dispersion regarding the GFI, and ii) the European countries
with a large percentage of citizens belonging to a denomination and a small
level of favoritism and vice-versa.
30We use data from the ESS and ISSP to empirically test our assumptions.
Interestingly, we observe that religious citizens are concerned about secular-
ization (and more concerned than non-religious citizens); religious citizens are
the majority in most European countries; and what is more, the percentage of
religious-averse citizens is marginal. This empirical evidence is consistent with
the assumptions of our model.
In sum, under political competition, government favoritism to religion makes
sense!
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